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Introduction
Is globalization a tool in the fight against corruption? How does globalization in terms of trade openness and financial liberalization affect corrupt practices and the fight against corruption through human development in developing countries? How are these phenomena related in wealth effects? Are findings different under linear and nonlinear conditions? This paper addresses the above concerns within the context of Africa in the light of Lalountas et al. (2011) 
hypotheses (conclusions): "Thus, our main conclusion is that globalization could be a powerful means of fighting corruption, only for middle and high income countries. For low income countries however, globalization has no significant impact on corruption. We might therefore conclude that at low levels of per capita income emphasis is given to the economic dimension of international integration and as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited. Persistence on globalization as an effective means to reduce corruption in developing countries might lead to inappropriate policies. On the contrary, at high levels of per capita income emphasis is given to the political and social dimensions of globalization
and as a result the effects of this phenomenon on corruption control are significant" (Lalountas et al., 2011, p. 645) .
There is abundant literature on the determinants of corruption (La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Iwasaki & Suzuki, 2012) and effects of globalization on corruption (Gatti, 1999; Das & DiRienzo, 2009) . However very few studies have been dedicated to the indirect relationship between corruption and globalization despite a substantial bulk of literature on the indirect link between the two phenomena (Bonaglia et al., 2001; Lalountas et al., 2011) . This paper therefore assesses how globalization affects corruption via human development.
But on what foundations are the phenomena choices of the paper based? Firstly, the choice of human development as a globalization channel is based on the fact that globalization upholds a global commitment to continuing and accelerating the pace of human development. In fact the phenomenon is the dominant force in the economic universe as it upholds economic prosperity in its lusty, ineluctable and historical process whose march can be stopped only by endangering the prosperity of peoples and nations. Globalization also threatens to disfigure human development in the manner it is evolving as it seeks a victory of market over government and self-interest over altruism (Asongu, 2012a) . Therefore not surprisingly, the public support for globalization has waned in both developed and developing countries with a frantic search for a third-way out of the morally enervating regime of unvarnished capitalism.
This has prompted universal demands to recapture some of its attractive glow and lofty ambitions; that the superior claims of globalization be given a 'human face" by saddling the increasingly ungovernable world of trade and finance with a global civic ethic. With the choice of human development as a channel cemented, we turn to a justification for the context of the study. Secondly, the choice of Africa is most relevant giving the continent's appalling statistics in development (human and economic) and corruption. This paper on a first note contributes to existing literature by examining the four concerns highlighted at the first paragraph of this introduction. Secondly, the use of much recent data (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) provides more updated policy implications. Thirdly, the focus on Africa where the human development and corruption debates are most tensed, helps elicit some glaring issues on structural adjustment policies (liberalization for the most part) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) in bid to improve human development. Fourthly, we cut adrift arbitrary income cut-off limits (Lalountas et al., 2011) 2 by examining wealth effects from four dimensions: low income, middle income, upper middle income and lower middle income.
2 Whereas, Lalounta et al. (2011) use a threshold of: GDP>825 US Dollars, we use four levels of income distribution in accordance with the World Bank Income group setting. The groups include: low income, $1,005 or less; lower middle income, $1,006 -$3,975; upper middle income, $3,976 -$12,275; and high income, $12,276 or more.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review existing literature on globalization, human development and corruption in Section 2. Data and methodology are presented and discussed respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
Globalization, human development and corruption

Theoretical highlights
Globalization and human development
Consistent with Thai (2006) production that undermines the redistributive mechanisms that were constructed through Keynesian social democracy. As noticed by Smart (2003) globalization features a 'market ethos' whose fervent pursuit of private interest operates without regard for persons (Thai, 2006) . In acknowledging this assertion Scholte (2000) posits, an unequal allocation of benefits is generated that favors the already advantaged. Though this radical stance is not explicitly shared by Sirgy et al. (2004) , they do predict several negative effects when asserting globalization has 'double-bladed' outcomes.
The neoliberal thesis (first school) contends globalization is an omnipresent power of 'creative destruction' in that global trade, cross-border investment and technological innovation improve production efficiency and generate extraordinary prosperity despite replacement of old jobs and fall in wages for unskilled workers. Openness manages these potential threats by signaling to the latter group about the pay-offs from acquiring new skills.
Rewards can stretch over to the masses 'if the labor market is responsive to changes in supply and demand' (Grennes, 2003) . Empirical studies have also documented that globalization is fashioned to spread industrialization to developing countries and hence mitigate global income inequality (Firebaugh, 2004) . Rodrik et al. (2004) find foreign trade to be closely tied to societal institutional building; which constitute a decisive factor in economic growth.
Globalization and corruption
How does openness influence the level of perceived corruption in a country?
According to Klitgaard (1988) , corruption thrives when monopoly power is combined with discretion and low accountability. Incentives to bribery do not arise in a society where all economic activities are carried out in a perfect competition setting and no single agent is able to affect the price or the quantity of the commodity he/she sells or buys. In the same line of thought, corruption is mitigated when economic rents do not depend on the discretionary power of some public officials or when monopolistic economic activities as well as governments are objects of strict rules of accountability. As emphasized by Treisman (2000) in Bonaglia et al. (2001) political openness to protestant traditions leads to a higher quality of government. Conversely, corruption is more pervasive when the state is federal, when a country's democratic basis is still young (less than 20 years) or when a country is less open to trade; consistent with Klitgaard (1988) .
Human development and corruption
In this section, we devote space to providing theoretical justification to the linkage between human development and corruption. The widely employed Human Development Index (HDI) encapsulates three main components: GDP per capita, literacy and life expectancy. Countries with the least levels in per capita economic prosperity, education and life expectancy have the tendency to be the most corrupt (Ahrend, 2000; Aidt et al., 2008; Orces, 2009) 3 . From a general standpoint, corruption is inversely related to the HDI. Thus, the HDI has a negative incidence on corruption (Orces, 2009) . Education mitigates corruption especially in countries with high levels of civic monitoring of those in power (Ahrend, 2000) 4 .
Economic prosperity reduces corruption in countries with quality institutions 5 , while in countries with poor institutions; growth may either have no impact (Aidt et al., 2008) or a negative effect on corruption. From intuition and common sense, the relationship between life expectancy and corruption should be a negative one. This is because the most likely punishment for corrupt practices is a prison sentence; and the likelihood of spending many years in prison (owing to high life expectancy) naturally stifles the temptation to engage in corrupt practices.
Factors linking globalization and corruption
In line with Bonaglia et al. (2001) from Krueger (1974) , financial and trade openness may alter the balance between corruption costs and benefits through the following mechanisms (strands).
The first mechanism focuses on rent-seeking activities caused by quantitative restrictions to imports. Contrary to tariffs, quotas and other official permissions, imports generate considerable economic rents due to the monopolistic power they grant to legal importers. In a bid to appropriate these rents, agents may legally compete or embark in illegal rent-seeking activities, corruption, bribery, smuggling and black markets. Krueger (1974) demonstrates that these rent-seeking activities induce an economy to operate at a level below its optimal, generate a divergence between private and social costs and thus entail a welfare cost additional to that due to tariff restrictions. In successive papers Kreuger's original idea was generalized to a theory of tariffs (Bhagwati, & Srinivasan, 1980) and Direct
Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) activities (Bhagwati, 1982) in which further arguments were provided in favour of trade and capital liberalizations. In a later study, Gatti (1999) presented some empirical evidence on the link between 'restrictions to openness' (trade & capital) and corruption. The empirical analysis disentangled two effects of inward-oriented policies on corruption: the 'direct policy distortion' and the 'foreign competition effect'. High walls to international transactions directly encourage private agents to bribe public officials in exchange for favoritism (the first distortion) and through the second effect, reduce competition between domestic and foreign firms so that margins for rent-seeking and corruption are kept high.
Ades & Di Tella (1999) provide evidence for the second competition-reducing mechanism. They posit that the level of rents in general and market structure in particular determine corruption intensity in an economy. They further postulate that changes in rents size due to variations in the degree of competition may have ambiguous effects on corruption.
On the one hand, larger rents resulting from a low competition environment increase the amount bureaucrats can extract as bribes; on the other hand, under such circumstances, it becomes more valuable to a society to increase accountability and monitoring of its developments, while competition is measured by the share of imports in GDP, the sectorconcentration of exports and distance from the world's major exporters. Given the same level in the other variables, countries less exposed to foreign imports (or with a large share of exports due to natural resources) should suffer higher levels of corruption than those countries more integrated in world markets and with a differentiated export basis.
In the third mechanism linking globalization to institutional quality, Wei (2000) explicitly considers differences in the cost of monitoring public officials due to the high level of international integration. The basic idea is plain: improving the quality of institutions and their capacity to fight corruption depend on the amount of resources a society allocates to this end. If a society invests more into building good institutions the larger the benefits it gets or smaller costs it incurs. Given that foreign producers may divert their exports or investments from a national market to another with more ease than domestic producers, one would expect bad governance and corruption to be more detrimental to international trade and capital than domestic commerce and investment. The differential effect of corruption induces stronger incentives towards good governance investments for those economies that are open (in trade and capital). Ceteris paribus, due to the resulting interesting benefits an economy more exposed to international markets would allocate more resources to fighting corruption and end-up with a lower corruption-level than one in isolation or autarky.
In the last strand we argue that, the three mechanisms (strands) elucidated above culminate in human development. Thus human development is a mechanism through which trade and financial globalization affect government quality (in the respect of corruption). This paper therefore focuses on the fourth strand. While assessing the relations of these phenomena we shall also be testing the Lalountas et al. (2011) hypotheses cited at the introduction of this work.
Testable hypotheses (conclusions)
In line with Lalountas et al. (2011) following resulting hypotheses (conclusions) will be tested in the empirical section of this paper.
Hypothesis 1: Globalization is a powerful tool in fighting corruption. Hypothesis 2: Globalization is an important tool in fighting corruption only in Middle and
High income countries.
Hypothesis 3: For Low income countries globalization has no significant impact on corruption.
Hypothesis 4: Hypotheses one and two are valid only under linearity.
Data and Methodology
Data
We examine a sample 30 countries from African Development Indicators ( 
Endogenous variables
The dependent variables are the 'corruption-control' indicator and Corruption Perception Index (CPI); consistent with the corruption literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2012b) . While Lalountas et al. (2011) 
Exogenous variable
The endogenous-explaining (exogenous) variable is the inequality adjusted Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for countries worldwide. This index has been widely used in the globalization (Mohammad et al., 2010; Rabbanee et al., 2010) and corruption (Nielsen & Hauguaard, 2000; Akçay, 2006) literature.
Instrumental variables
Borrowing from Table 4 below on: extension of the nonlinearity assumption with HAC standard errors).
Control variables
In accordance with Lalountas et al. (2011) and recent African government-quality literature (Asongu, 2011a , Asongu, 2012c we control for good governance in terms of democratic institutions and voice & accountability. Thus we expect these indicators to increase the CPI as well as the control of corruption. Note should taken of the fact that, an increase in the CPI amounts to a decrease in corruption level.
Methodology
Endogeneity
The concern for endogeneity could be emphasized on three main counts. (1) Though there is an implicit assumption that human development affects government quality in the perspective of (the fight against) corruption, the reversed effect cannot be ruled-out since, human development is also contingent on corrupt practices. Thus the strict exogeneity of the human development channel is questionable. (2) The CPI is a synthesis of perception based measures which are often subject to bias resulting from media propaganda or other factors.
Therefore there is glaring evidence of omitted variables. (3) From a topical consideration, we seek to assess the relationship between three phenomena, which by definition inherently requires an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique.
Estimation technique
In line with Lalountas et al. (2011) estimation method adopted by this study will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression:
The independent control variables are represented by X in the two equations. In Eq.
(1) and Eq. (2), v and u respectively denote the disturbance terms. Trade and financial openness (FDI) represent globalization instruments. 'HD' stands for human development while corruption entails the CPI or corruption-control indicator.
Robustness checks
For robustness purposes, the empirical analysis: (1) uses alternative indicators of corruption ; (2) makes use of four distinct income levels to emphasis wealth effects; (3) accounts for endogeneity; (4) models under both linear and nonlinear hypotheses; (5) estimates with and without HAC (Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent) standard errors.
Empirical Analysis
This section addresses the ability of the exogenous components of human development to account for differences in the CPI and corruption-control; the ability of the globalization instruments to explain variations in the endogenous components of human development and the possibility of the globalization instruments to account for the CPI and corruption-control beyond human development channels. To make these assessments, we use the panel TSLS-IV estimation method with financial and trade liberalization measures as instrumental variables. -Long, 1995; Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Asongu, 2011b) and theoretical postulations (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990) . All these have emphasized the disequalizing redistributive income effect of foreign investment, which in contextual terms depict decrease in inequality adjusted human development. (2) GDP per capita growth has a positive effect on human development. This is consistent with its constituency in the HDI. (3) Development assistance is detrimental to human development: in line with the aiddevelopment literature on developing countries (Boone,1996; Reichel,1995; Ghura,1995; Pedersen,1996; Asongu, 2012d) . (4) Financial globalization improves government quality: in accordance with Klitgaard (1988) . (5) From common sense to a certain extent economic theory, regulation quality (autocracy) improves (decreases) government quality. Given the validity of joint significance (Fisher test) in estimated coefficients, we proceed with the second-stage of the TSLS approach. 
Development and globalization
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Corruption, human development and globalization
Tables 2-3 investigate two main issues: (1) the ability of the human development channel to explain changes in the CPI and corruption-control and; (2) the possibility of the globalization instrumental variables explaining changes in the CPI and corruption-control beyond the human development channel. Whereas we address the first issue by investigating the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is assessed by the Sargan-OIR test for instrument validity. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the view that the instruments account for corruption dynamics only through the human development channel. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection of the view that the instruments explain corruption dynamics through no other mechanisms than human development channels. The
Hausman-test for endogeneity precedes every TSLS-IV regression and thus justifies the choice of the estimation approach. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that OLS estimates are consistent and efficient. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the concern of reverse causality (endogeneity) we have elucidated earlier (see Section 3. As concerns the second-issue, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR test in 15 of the 16 'Fisher-significant' regressions implies that globalization instruments explain corruption through no other mechanisms beside human development and good governance channels. Thus the globalization instruments are valid as they are not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. All four regressions pertaining to Low income countries have insignificant Fisher statistics; which is why the Sargan-OIR test analysis is based on 16 regressions. For robustness purposes, regressions in Table 2 are replicated in Table 3 with HAC standard errors. The two issues on significance of estimated coefficients and validity of the instruments still apply in the interpretation of the regression output. Results in Table 3 are robust to those in Table 2 , both in terms of significance in estimated coefficients and validity of the instruments.
Further robustness tests on nonlinearity
For further robustness purposes, in line with Lalountas et al. (2011) we extend the nonlinearity hypothesis from globalization instruments to the human development endogenous explaining variable. Thus we use the squared HDI and level good governance variables as explaining variables. With these nonlinear interactions in both instrumental and endogenous explaining variables, findings do not appear to differ from those in Tables 2-3. 
Discussion, policy implications and limitations
Retrospect to hypotheses and policy implications
Before delving into the discussion of results, it is vital to highlight the hypotheses motivating this paper. Lalountas et al. (2011) (Lalountas et al., 2011, p. 645) . We have tested these hypotheses in Africa from different methodological and contextual standpoints. Though not form, yet in substance our intuition and motivation are compatible with those of Lalountas et al. (2011) . In the analysis, while the economic and social dimensions of globalization have been reflected in the HDI, the political dimension has been captured by good governance indicators. For clarity in elucidations, we shall dissect the hypotheses in the light of our empirical results.
Hypothesis 1: Globalization is a powerful tool in fighting corruption. True
Our analysis demonstrates that globalization (in terms of trade and finance) instrumented on human development mitigates (ameliorates) corruption (the control of corruption) in Africa. In plainer terms, globalization is an instrumental tool in fighting corruption through human development and good governance. As a policy implication, there is need for human development and government quality to go hand in glove before such an achievement could be discounted. As we have observed from findings in Table 1, trade liberalization is the component of globalization that improves human development. This positive outcome could emanate from cheap imports in basic human needs flooding African markets from China and beyond (Asongu, 2012a) . It follows that cheap imports increase consumer purchasing power, thus decreasing incentives to subsistence-oriented corruption.
Therefore this finding broadly confirms the theoretical underpinning from Klitgaard (1988) in which corruption thrives when monopoly is combined with discretion and low accountability.
The positive effect of trade openness on human development diminishes incentives to bribery common to societies governed by monopolistic activities. for UMI countries and find the following: (1) the positive effect of trade openness on the HDI is insignificant; (2) the negative effect of FDI on the HDI is four times greater in comparison to the African average. We therefore only partially concur with Lalountas et al. (2011) in the assertion that at high levels of per capita, emphasis is given to the political and social dimensions of globalization and as a result the effect of this phenomenon on corruptioncontrol is significant.
Hypothesis 3:
For Low income countries globalization has no significant impact on corruption. True Our analyses concur with this hypothesis, which is robustly valid. Thus we join Lalountas et al. (2011) in concluding that at low levels of per capita income, emphasis is placed on the economic dimension of international integration and as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited. As a policy implication, persistent globalization as an effective means to reduce corruption in low income countries might lead to inappropriate policies. 
Further discussions and limitations
Over the past decades, the issue of corruption and the search for strategies to fight its corrosive effects have grown in importance as a topic of public debate and a criterion by which the civil society evaluates leadership. This increased attention is motivated by the realization among international development experts that development requires above all good governance. The combat against corruption remains an important priority of policy making bodies in the African continent.
Globalization is the dominant force in the economic universe as it upholds economic prosperity in its lusty, ineluctable and historical process whose march can be stopped only by endangering the prosperity of people and nations. This phenomenon has also been alleged to disfigure human development in the manner it is evolving as it seeks a victory of market over government and self-interest over altruism (Asongu, 2012a) . The public support for globalization has waned and prompted universal demands to recapture some of its attractive glow and lofty ambitions, so that the phenomenon be given a human face.
Many international institutions consider globalization as a powerful tool to fighting corruption since it presupposes structural and institutional reforms such as liberalization of commodity markets, strengthening of competition, extended transfer of technology and managerial expertise, securing of property rights, rule of law, transparency and increased quality of public services that improve country attractiveness with respect to trade and investment. These reforms constitute the transmission channel via which globalization affects the control of corruption. This paper has assessed the Lalountas et al. (2011) hypotheses and results (as elucidated in the previous section) are in line with the neoliberal school, contrary to the hegemony thesis on globalization. Thus, we may firmly conclude from a corruption-control standpoint that globalization is an omnipresent power of 'creative destruction' and side with Rodrik et al. (2004) in postulating that the phenomenon is closely tied to human development; which constitutes a decisive factor in societal institutional building (fighting corruption).
An important limitation to take into account is that studies of this kind depend to a great extent on the integrity of the proxy for corruption obtained from perception-based measures. Thus omitted variables and media-effect may substantially influence perceptions on corruption and consequently bias the link between globalization instruments, the human development indicator and corruption measures. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no better measurements of corruption than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The paper has limited the ills of this draw-back by using two different measures of corruption. Also, the application of an estimation approach that accounts for endogeneity addresses the concerns of omitted variables and bias in the perception based measures. In terms of policy implications: (1) in countries with high levels of per capita, emphasis is placed on the political and social dimensions of globalization and as a result the effect of this phenomenon on corruption-control is significant; (2) on the other hand, in nations with low levels of per capita income, emphasis is given to the economic dimension of international integration and as a result the effect of globalization on corruption is limited; (3) persistent globalization as an effective means to reduce corruption in developing countries might lead to inappropriate policies for low income countries.
Conclusion
The Lalountas et al. (2011) hypotheses this paper has investigated could be extended to country-specific analyses for more focused policy implications. Another interesting line of inquiry could deal with the incidence on corruption through-out the conditional distribution of corruption. The premise of this second future research direction is the fact that, corruption thresholds may affect the Lalountas et al. conclusions differently. It follows that, countries with higher levels of corruption within an income-category may respond differently to the dynamics, in comparison to their counterparts with lower corruption levels.
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